RECENT CASES
tural Adjustment Act, but for a conspiracy to violate the statute protecting the United
States against frauds. United States v. Kapp.'
The current popularity of the plea of unconstitutionality in the federal courts has
not been confined to civil suits. In criminal cases where the statute, under which defendants acted, has either been declared unconstitutional before the indictment,2 or
has not been before the United States Supreme Court at the time of the trial,3 the plea
has been overruled. The gist of the offense is said to be a conspiracy to defraud the
government and any attack on the statute which gave the defendant an opportunity
to perpetrate the fraud is collateral to the issue.4 The false claims statutes under which
these indictments are brought, aims to protect the government against those who have
the intention to defraud it, regardless of the constitutional authority of the government to participate in activity which gives the defendant his opportunity to attempt
the fraud.
A different problem arises, however, if the defendants in these cases are indicted
under an act which either had been declared, or is alleged to be, unconstitutional. The
intent to defraud, coupled with the unsuccessful attempt to defeat the operations of
6
an apparently valid statute, would seem to be sufficient to impose criminal liability.
On the other hand, the doctrine that an act must be a crime at the time of its occurrence and at the time of trial in order to be punishable,7 would seem to negative liability
in the cases where the statute has been declared unconstitutional prior to the trial.
Evidence-Self-Incrimination-Searches and Seizures-[Federal].-Defendants,
under the authority of the Securities Act of 1933,' sought by subpoenas duces tecurn to
obtain copies of all telegrams sent or received by the plaintiffs and others between certain dates relating to specified transactions. Suits were brought to restrain the defendants from enforcing the subpoenas. On appeals from orders granting interlocutory
injunctions, held, reversed. The subpoenas were not a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination,2 nor did they constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.3 Newfield v. Ryan et al. (two cases) and Ballentine v. FloridaTex Oil Co. et al.4
158

S. Ct. 182 (1937).

2 United

States v. Harding et at., 8i F. (2d) 563 (App. D.C. 1936) (National Industrial
Recovery Act).
3 Ranger v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 817, 824 (C.C.A. 8th 1935 )(Reconstruction Finance
Corp. Act); Madden v. United States, 8o F. (2d) 672, 674 (C.C.A. 8th 1935) (Public Works
Administration); United States v. Soeder et at., xo F. Supp. 944 (Mo. x935) (Agricultural
Adjustment Act); United States v. MacDonald et al., ioF. Supp. 948 (Mo. 1935) (Agricultural
Adjustment Act).
4 Ranger v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 817 (C.C.A. 8th 1935).
s40 Stat. oiS (xgi8), 18 U.S.C.A. § 8o (1927).
6 See People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412 (1890).
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 28 Mass. 35o (1831).
' 48 Stat. 74 et seq. (1933), i5 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq. (1937).
2U.S. Const. 5th Amend., ".. .'.nor shall (any person) be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ......
3 U.S. Const. 4th. Amend., "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..... "
4 91 F. (2d) 700 (C.C.A. 5 th 1937), cert. denied, 58 S. Ct. 54 (i937), petition for rehearing
denied, 58 S. Ct. 137 (1937).
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Making available copies of telegrams to the Securities Exchange Commission will
aid in the effective administration of the Securities Exchange Act. Neither the history
of, nor the present justifications for the privilege against self-incrimination should dictate a contrary result. The historical basis of the privilege-a desire to limit the jurisdictional encroachment of the English ecclesiastical courts and to eliminate the inquisitional oath of the Star Chamber--cannot be its justification today.6 Two ex post
facto rationalizations are recited in defense of the privilege, "fairness,"7 and the notion
that "any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually
to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby."'5
To the first objection Bentham's classical Old Woman's9 and Fox Hunter's o reasons
are eloquent answers. As for the second, it is understandable only in the sense that the
absence of the privilege might give the prosecution a power complex at the expense of
the accused's legal rights." Notwithstanding the existence in the United States of the
privilege, there exist a legion of instances of brutal police methods. 2 Its prevalance is
in part due to the existence of the privilege, since it immunizes from legal process other
wise available evidence, and hence puts a premium on extra-legal methods of getting
the same evidence.'3
Not only are the arguments advanced in favor of the privilege unconvincing, but
there are affirmative reasons for removing it. It deters the investigation and ultimate
punishment of anti-social behavior, since the only incriminating evidence may be un54 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250 (2d ed. 1923); 13 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 65i (i937); Wigmore,
Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere,5 Harv. L. Rev. 71 (1891).
6 See Limburg, The Privilege of the Accused to Refuse to Testify, 52 Annals of Am. Acad.
of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 124, 129 (1914).
7Boyd v. U.S., ii6 U.S. 616, 631 (i886).
84 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 2251.
9"The essence of this reason is contained in the word 'hard'; 'tis 'hard' upon a man to be
obliged to criminate himself. Hard it is upon a man, it must be confessed, to be obliged to do
anything that he does not like. That he should not much like to do what is meant by his
criminating himself, is natural enough; for what it leads to is his being punished. What is no
less hard upon him is that he should be punished: but did it ever yet occur to a man to propose
a general abolition of all punishment with this hardship for a reason for it." 5 Bentham,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 230 (1827).
10"This consists in introducing upon the carpet of legal procedure the idea of fairness, in
the sense in which the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to have a fair chance for his life:
he must have (so close is the analogy) what is called law: leave to run a certain length of way,
for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape. While under pursuit, he must not
be shot: it would be as unfair as convicting him of burglary on a hen-roost, in five minute's
time in a court of conscience ...... " Id., at 238; but see 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supranote 3, at 822.
xx4 Wigmore, op. cit. supranote 5, at 826, citing Stephen, History of the Criminal Law I,

342, 441, 535, 542, 565 (I883).

-National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in
Law Enforcement (i93i); Villard, Official Lawlessness, The Third Degree and the Crime
Wave, 155 Harper's Magazine 6o5 (1927); Murphy, The Third Degree: Another Side of our

Crime Problems

(1929).

For an exhaustive citation of appellate cases evidencing third degree

methods during the nineteen twenties, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1930).
'3 Waite, Criminal Law in Action 143, z44 (934); Stevens, Archaic Constitutional Provisions Protecting the Accused, 5 Jour. Cr. L. and Cr. r8, i9 (1914).
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available as a result of the assertion of the privilege.x4 The vogue of immunity statutes,' s granting suspected individuals freedom from prosecution if they give evidence
which otherwise would be incriminating, but would aid in the prosecution of others,
is legislative recognition that the privilege may be a bar to the proper prosecution of
those suspected of crime.
Historically the privilege protected a witness from "testimonial compulsion."' 6
This has been interpreted to include documents owned by the accused and taken from
his possession,7 since he is at any time subject to authenticate the documents as a
witness.,' Such an extension of the privilege ignores the fact that other persons are
qualified to authenticate the documents, in the event that the person from whose
possession the documents were taken claims his privilege.19 Since under statutes such
as the Securities Exchange Act most proof must be made by the use of documentary
evidence, such a broadening of the privilege, as a practical matter, would partially
nullify the Act.20 But there is usually no privilege when documents are taken from the
possession of a third person." The claim of privilege in the instant case was probably
based on the notion of property2 interest by the plaintiffs in the telegrams and a confidential relationship between the plaintiffs and the telegraph companies. It is difficult
to see why a combination of the concepts "property" and "confidential relationship"
should result in an extension of the privilege.
It has been suggested, contrary to the cases, that it is never correct, historically at
least, to speak of a subpoena duces tecum as an unreasonable search and seizure and
therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment.23 But it is now well settled that a subpoena general in its scope is a violation of that constitutional guarantee.24 Since the
subpoenas in the instant case were confined to telegrams sent between definite dates,
dealing with specific subject matter, and sent or received by certain individuals, and
'4 Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law, 15 Yale L. J. i (rgo5); Limburg, op. cit.
supra note 6, 124 el seq.

1sFor an exhaustive citation of such statutes see 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5,§ 2281,
n. io.
164 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note s, § 2263.
'7 Boyd v. U.S., 1i6 U.S. 66 (1885); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (59o6); Internal Revenue
Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (D.C. N.Y. 1923).
1S4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2264.
'9 Chamberlayne, Trial Evidence § 1027
(2d ed. 1926).
2oHowever, corporations may not claim the privilege, 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5,
§ 2259(a).
24
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5,§ 2259; Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361, 376 (igio);
McMann v. Engel, 16 F. Supp. 446 (1936).
"See Hitchcock, The Inviolability of Telegrams, 5 So. L. Rev. 32 (1879). Cf. property
rights equity recognizes in letters, Boker v. Tibbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
23 Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission: HI, 28

Col. L. Rev. 9o5, 909 et seq. (1928).
24 Hale

v. Henkel, 205 U.S. 43 (i9o); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco

Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894);

see also McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 87 F. (2d) 377 (C.C.A.
see also note 25 infra.
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were to be used in connection with a particular investigation, they would seem not to
be a "fishing expedition," but a reasonable demand and therefore within the Fourth
Amendment.2s

Evidence-Wrongful Death-Admissibility of Plaintiff's Evidence on Deceased's
Careful Habits-[Illinois].-In an action for the death of the plaintiff's intestate,
struck by the defendant's automobile, the plaintiff called the defendant who testified
fully on the accident. There were no other eyewitnesses. Later the plaintiff introduced
evidence on the careful habits of his intestate to prove freedom from contributory
negligence. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held, reversed. The habit
evidence should have been excluded as the defendant, called by the plaintiff, was an
eyewitness. Scally v. Flannery.,
The instant decision might well have been expected, for logical conclusions to be
drawn from the Illinois cases practically preclude the effective use of habit evidence
to show freedom from contributory negligence in any case in which the defendant has
seen the accident. In the recent case of Nordman v. Carlson,2 where the plaintiff had
declined to call the defendant as an eyewitness, evidence of the careful habits of the
deceased was admitted. The decision was based on the ground that such evidence is
rendered inadmissible only by the availability of a competent eyewitness and that the
defendant was rendered incompetent by the Illinois "dead man" statute.3 There is
Illinois authority, however, to the effect that if the plaintiff or another person interested in the estate testifies to the careful habits of the deceased on the issue of freedom
from contributory negligence, such testimony is evidence of a "transaction"4 between
the defendant and the deceased and removes the defendant's incompetency.S If this
authority were followed the defendant could testify, and then logically the habit evidence originally admitted would have to be stricken.6 Upon this analysis, the defendant's testimony, since rendered admissible only by that of the plaintiff, should also
be stricken. This peculiar result might best be avoided by deeming the defendant's
objection to the plaintiff's habit evidence waived by the introduction of direct evidence
based on its admission.
The general rule that habit evidence is inadmissible if testimony of credible eyewitnesses' is available8 seems perfectly sound. The probative value of a general habit
2- Cf. Hearst v. Black, 87 F. (2d) 68 (App. D.C. 1936), noted 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1383 (1937);
see also Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924); 36
Col. L. Rev. 84 (1936).
' 292 Ill. App. 349, xi N.E. (2d) 123 (,937).
2 291 III. App. 438, io N.E. (2d) 53 (1937).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 51, § 2.

4An accident is a "transaction" within the meaning of the statute. Van Meter v. Gold£ arb, 217 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925).
s Rouse v. Tomasek, 279 Ill. App. 557 (i935).
6Moore v. Bloomington D. & C. R. Co., 295 Ill. 63, 128 N.E.
299 Ill. 552, 132 N.E. 779 (1921).

721 (1920);

Soucie v. Payne,

7 The problem of whether a person is an eyewitness has raised some difficulty: One who
saw the deceased shortly before or after the accident has been held to be an eyewitness.
Cox v. Chicago & N.W.R.Co., 9 Ill. App. iS (igoo); Anderson v. Metropolitan W.S.E. Co.,

